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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the World War nations of the globe have been
groaning under the burden of enormous war debts. These debts
represent wealth employed for destructive purposes. Unlike nor-
mal business debts, these expenditures to prosecute a world-wide
conflict have been totally unproductive; no benefits have ac-
crued to the world at large. Goods and man-power have been di-
verted from productive channels. In the post-war scramble to
make up, in a measure, these losses, to rehabilitate industry
and commerce, these nations (among various steps) have resorted
to the setting up of trade barriers in the form of discrimina-
tory tariffs. In their endeavors to preserve domestic markets,
a number of creditor governments have (whether deliberately or
unwittingly) shut out - to a great extent - the trade of some
debtor countries. A trade war of international scope has re-
sulted. A strong desire, no doubt, for national security -
based on economic wellbeing - has prompted such measures. But
these very measures have served to produce the opposite effect,
on the whole. Every nation of the world has been the loser as a
consequence. Debtor nations have been unable, in a degree, to
ship goods or sell services because of these trade barriers,
whereby they might accumulate sufficient money of their creditor
nations with which to pay their war debts. These unpaid obliga-
tions have tended to hang like a pall over the world, causing
economic unrest and generally destroying that confidence essen-
tial to world recovery. The purpose, therefore, of the follow-

ing discussion is to determine whether the most desirable solu-
tion of the v/ar debt problem lies in the complete cancellation of
these debts in the interest of favorable trade conditions for the
entire world - to promote, to stimulate, world-wide economic re-
covery.

CHAPTER I
HISTORY OF THE INTER -GOVERNMENT AL WAR DEBTS

CHAPTER I
The first considerations that present themselves v/hen one
studies the inter-governmental v^ar debt problem are embodied in
the queries: V^liat circumstances surrounded the negotiation of
such huge loans? V»liat is the nature of these unprecedented
[financial transactions which, seemingly, have served to upset
Ithe economic equilibrium of the world? Also, what were the
lloriginal attitudes toward these loans by all concerned? Pinallyj
what were the terms covering these borrowings?
Before the United States entered the war. Great Britain
served in the role of banker for the Allies. Having been unable
to furnish a large army at once for active service, she felt it
jher duty to make substantial loans to Russia, France, Italy, the
bominions, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, Portugal and Greece.
During this period the total inter-governmental loans amounted to
|4,328.9 million dollars at par exchange. Of the amoimt Great
|Britain loaned 5,814.4 millions. During the same period, how-
jever, the French government borrowed 555 million dollars from the
pritish government.^ Although the United States as a neutral did
ot officially take part in these financial transactions, private
lAmerican sources did supply part of the credits used by the
Hies. The -^500,000,000 five per cent Anglo-French bond issue
of 1915, floated by American bankers, stands out as the largest
2
grant of credit from private individuals.
!• Moulton and Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Prosperity ; p. 35.
2. Foreign Policy Association; vol. Ill; Special Supplement, no. 1;
United States and the War Debts ; p. 5.

A
It is apparent that when the United States entered the war
on April 6, 1917, the Allied governments were in deep financial
[distress • "By their own admission at the time we came into the
situation, the Allies were at their wits end to know which way
to turn in order to obtain needed supplies."^ In view of this,
and the fact that the United States could not provide an effect-
ive army immediately, she considered it her place to provide
2
financial aid at once on a scale hitherto unknown in history.
This assistance we agreed to furnish in the face of the tremen-
dous financial requirements in America's own war program*
For three main reasons this policy seemed to he "preferable
to merely facilitating access to the American Capital market and
letting the Allied nations supply their requirements out of
loans offered to American banks and private investors": First,
foreign governments v/ould not be competitors, then, with the
United States TreasTiry in the American money markets; second, it
was a question whether our allies could borrow ample funds by
negotiating directly - if so, the rate of interest being pro-
jl. H. £• Fisk, The Inter-Ally Debts ; p. 8
2. "Our loans were our answer to Europe's appeals for aid, lest
she perish. They enabled the debtor nations to purchase food
and munitions, to sustain their armies in the field and to
feed their civilian populations. They were made in the face
of threatened military defeat and at a time when internal
fil4vll disorders threatened to engulf and destroy the borrow-
ers." Bainbridge Colby, Proceedings of Academy of Political
Science; vol. XV; May, 1932; "Should War Debts Be Cancelled?":
pp. 68-69

5hlbitive; third, our Treasury, in its role as banker to the
Allies, could better "co-ordinate European purchases with those
effected by the American government, " making for "more efficient
utilization of available supplies," besides keeping prices down
iln the absence of competition betv/een American and foreign
1
purchasers.
In his war message of April 2, 1917, President "vVilson
stated that the waging of war with Germany "will involve the ut-
most practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the
governments now at war with Germany, and as incident to that,
the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial
credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be
2
added to theirs." He further said, "In carrying out the
measures by which these things are to be accomplished (the
prosecution of the war without severe inflation) we should keep
constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possi-
ple in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own mili-
tary forces with the duty - for it will be a very practical
duty - of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with
|the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our
assistance. They are in the field, and we should help them in
every way to be effective there."
j
At once Congress applied itself to putting into legislation
the recommendations of the President. The first Liberty Loan
|j
111. Moulton and Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Prosperity ; pp. 56,^7.
2. Woodrow Wilson, The War Message and Facts Behind l€7p.l5
3. Ibid; p. 14

Act, authorizing a five billion dollar bond issue and a loan of
three billion dollars to be made to our allies, became a law
^
April 24, 1917."^ Three Liberty Loan Acts followed - September
!24, 1917, April 4, 1918, and July 9, 1918. These four acts
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, subject to the approval
of the President, to furnish credits to the Allies to an amount h
|l
not to exceed ten billion dollars. These obligations of the
foreign governments (Allies) the American government was to pur-
chase at par» The terms of repayment were to be essentially the
j
same as those governing the sale of Liberty bonds to the people
2
of the United States. During the actual war period our Treasury'
advanced credits to seven nations: Great Britain, Russia, Italy,
France, Belgium, Serbia (Jugoslavia), and Cuba, By the time of
the Armistice our loans to the Allies had reached the total of
$7,077,000,000,^
For two years after the signing of the Armistice loans were
made to foreign governments. Under the Liberty Loan Acts of
Congress it was stipiilated that loans were to be made for the
purpose of prosecuting the war and only to those nations at war
with enemies of the United States. But peoples of Europe were
either starving or on the verge of starvation. Our industries
were in full operation producing vast amounts of supplies under
war contracts. The sudden cancellation of these would have had a
i? %
1. Foreign Policy Association; vol.IIIjSpecial Supplement, no.l;
United States and the 7«ar Debts ; p. 6.
2. Moulton and Pasvol sky. War De'FHs and Prosperity ; p. 37.
5. H. E. Fisk, The Inter-Ally Debts ; p. 8
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disastrous effect at home in the employment situation, invest-
ments, and the buying power of the public. Congress, evidently,
could not sense the seriousness of the situation, in refusing to
amend the loan ^iCts. But the administration overcame these
difficulties by considering the war as still being carried on,
since these same acts declared that by proclamation of the
President was the legal end of the war to be determined."^
Of the post-armistice loans, three-fourths were granted
under the Liberty Loan ACts. Other advances by our Treasury
were authorized by special acts of Congress. It is true that we
loaned to countries other than those that had been at war with
enemies of the United States. We felt obliged to lend to these
governments, in the name of humanitarianism. Part of the funds
was used to liquidate war accounts, part to pay interest on war
2
time loans, and a portion for reconstruction and relief work.
The authorities on war debts vary a few millions on the total of
ost-armistice loans made by the American government. In a
statement prepared from official Treasury reports, the official
3
figure has been given as s|52,521,000,000.
Much discussion has taken place as to what have constituted
^ar expenditures on the part of our allies and what can be termed
commercial expenditures. In a war of such magnitude, during
Which time the entire resources of each warring nation were
mobilized, the money expended for civil purposes must have
1. H.E.Fisk, The Inter-Ally Debts ; p. 9
1^. Moulton and Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Pro3perity ;pp. 58,59
5. Foreign Policy Association: vol . Ill; Special Supplement, no.l;
X The United States and the War Debts; p. 4.
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strengthened in general the defense eBtp.tli shments of each
nation. If France and England uped part of the money 'borrowed
from us to "peg their exchanges," or to huy food for their civil
populations, cr, even, for Great Britain to "furnish India v.dth
silver," it all contriV;uted to the general v/ellheing of these
Allies, and enabled them to better prosecute the war,. We must
net lose sight of the fact that the grep.ter portion of these
funds Tap spent in the United States. "They flowed back into
the hands of fBrmers, manufacturers, wage earners, etc., as the
governments spent them for goods and services required in the
war. They went into increased niant and eouipment, into in-
creased savings, into higher priced land and into larger ex-
penditures by the consuming public.""^
It has been contended that Great Britain borrowed from the
United States for the purpose of lending to her Allies on the
continent, to :nake it possible for them to continue their v;ar
operations. But this argument is ansv/ered in many quarters.
The outstanding answer comes from Great Britain, The London
Economi st of January 10, 1925, rerjlies to this contention in an
editorial, saying, in Tnart: "But we cannot argue that if v/e had
not been compelled to lend to our European Allies v/e need not
have borrowed from Ainerica; the reason we had to borrow from the
Anierican Government was that - large though our internal loans
might be - we had no means of securing credit in dollars
1. The ITational Industrial Oonference Board, Inter -Ally Debts
and United States; p, 108.

9It is quite certain that even if France had not had to make
.further purchases in Great Britain in 1917 and 1918, we should
still have been under the necessity of borrowing in dollars in
the United States in order to feed Great Britain and to provide
the material which America alone could supply.
The loans to the Allies v/ere made from funds raised from
taxation and the sale of Liberty Bonds, They v/ere not advanced
"as lump sums granted in advance," but v/ere given as needed for
"current purchases of supplies in exactly the same way as if
1
they were being used for purchases of supplies for American use"*
With few exceptions, loans were granted only under the condition
they be used for purchases in America. The Allies had their
:'separate purchasing agencies, but these so cooperated with the
American Agencies - the Purchasing Commission, the War Industrie?
Board, the Food and Fuel Administrations and the War Trade Board
- th^t Allied buying in the United States v/as "effectually con-
2
itrolled "as to quantity, character, and terms. The United
States Treasury did not make the expenditures for the Allies, buli
it paid to the Allies the purchase price of certain securities
offered by these governments, and they made the expenditures.
itChese governments were obliged to forward to the Treasury a de-
tailed account of their purchases. The Treasury then granted
sufficient credit (covered by the seciirities) to these govern-
ments to cover the costs of the materials purchased.
1. Quoted on pp. 60, 61, the National Industrial Conference Board,
Inter-Ally Debts and United States .
2. The National Industrial Conference Board, Inter-Ally Debts and
United States; p. 42.
xuia-=-= - r
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The uses made of the credits may be noted in the following
list^ of materials and services purchased by the Allies:
Munitions, including remounts 2,493,610,000^
Mxinitions for other governments 205,495,000
Exchange and cotton purchases 2,644,783,000;
Cereals 1,422, 476, OOo!
Other foods 1,629,726,000
Tobacco 145 , 100, OOo|
Other Supplies 613,107,000
Transportation .l36,083,OOol
Shipping 173,397, 000
Intere s t 750 , 504 , 000
Maturities 648,246,000
Relief 558,188,000
Silver 267,943,000j|
Pood for Korthern Russia 7,029,000
Purchases from Keutrals 18,718,000
Special Credit against credits to be established for
United States Government war purchases in Italy 25,000,000
Miscellaneous 168, 530,000
;|il, ^67,943,000
"Those expenditures exceeded the net advances of
9,466,283,000 made by the United States up to November 1, 1920,
by ^.2,401,661,000. This difference apparently v;as provided by
1. Quoted on page 8, Foreign Policy Association; vol. III;
Special Supplement, No. 1; The United States and the V/ar
Debts ; from a United States Treasury report.
Also quoted on page 176, H. £• Fisk, The Inter-Ally Debts.
01
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other resources of the purchasing governments."
Almost three years elapsed after the signing of the Treaty
of Versailles before the problem of inter-govermnental debts
presented itself strongly to various governments. Too many other
weighty problems had claimed the attention of these nations in-
volved in the war. Possibly each one concerned awaited the first
move of its creditor or creditors, hoping that a policy of can-
cellation would be adopted. During this time much diplomatic
correspondence passed between representatives of the United
States and those of our debtor countries on this subject. The
United States would not alter her determined position of insist-
ence on the funding of the war debts. There is evidence in
letters that passed between high American officials and European
statesmen to support the suspicion that the Allied governments
[had taken it "very largely for granted" that the United States
would "pursue a policy of debt cancellation" - possibly, at
2least, in the matter of pre-armis tice loans.
During the early post-v/ar period the informal debt dis-
cussions revealed a difference in the viev/point of the United
iStates and allied governments as to the character of the v/ar
jdebts. The loans were not regarded as gifts but as purely
jicommercial obligations. "The loans were evidenced at first
li
by short-term obligations, renewed at maturity, and later by
1. H. E. Fisk, The Inter-Ally Debts ; p. 177.
2. Foreign Policy Association; vol. Ill; Special Supplement,
j
no. 1; The United States and the V/ar Debts ; p. 15.
Too
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^idemand obligations. Technical difficulties alone prevented,
{while the war v/as still in progress, the conversion of these
\ 1
obligations into definite long-term bonds." Our Treasury
officials clearly pointed out to the Allied governments that the
loans we advanced were niade with the "definite expectation" of .
being repaid "in full" at the end of the war. "ViTiile accenting '
the point of view of the American govemment as to the nature of
I
the advances made by the United States Treasury, Allied govern-
ments had from the beginning regarded the loans among themselves
as a phase of war cooperation and had assumed that these credits
would be adjusted at the end of the conflict as a part of the
2
general liquidation of the war."
It would not be out of place to pause here to review briefly
the significance of these loans - from the iiine rican viewpoint -
as discussed in an official bulletin issued by the Treasury de-
partment of the United states the latter part of 1917. It was
contended that not only for our military protection, but for our
economic wellbeing, the loans were necessary. It was stated that
we needed markets for the surplus goods we produced, and that the
sale of this surplus to our Allies would contribute to our
"economic protection and welfare." It v/as pointed out that the
commercial strength of our Allies made for greater effectiveness
in their prosecution of the war, and that this called for an ex-
||
port trade "maintained in a suitable measure. " By aiding them to
1. Moulton and Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Prosperity ; p. 51
2. Ibid.
II
Sit.
maintain their industrial life and commercial welfare we were
1
following a "sound economic policy."
Attention was called to the fact that most of the money
loaned was spent in the United States, largely for war materials
;and foodstuffs. It was emphasized that tiie money we v;ere advancy
ling was a loan, calling for interest payment and repayment of the
loan in full. It was pointed out that "our Allies were looked
upon by us as solvent people without ready money but with per-
fectly good credit." Our people were informed that certain
^American agencies supervised the expenditures of our Allies in
the United States; that the same prices and terms insisted on by
2
our government were also obtained by the Allies.
'
"In conclusion, it was stated that the loans made to our
Allies enabled them to do the fighting which otherwise the
American army would have had to do at mudi expense not only of
men but of money - money which would not be returned to us and
lives that could never be restored. It v/as therefore claimed
that we were not only performing a duty to our associates in
'lending them a part of our great wealth but that we were also
jperforming a duty to our soldiers and sailors and our own nation
in making our allies powerful and effective, »thus lessening the
work and danger and suffering for our own men in bringing the war
3
to an earlier close.'"
||
However, in the face of such declarations, made in the heat
!iL. H. E. Fisk, The Inter-Ally Debts ; p. 173.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid; p. 174.
^
-
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of wartime emotion, the United States - true to its character-
ization as the Shylock of the nations? - turned its attention to^
the repayment of these loans. During the presidential election i
campaign of 1920 the v/ar debts of the Allies had been drawn intoj
the campaign as a political issue. The Republican party had
|
promised that "if successful in the election the new administra-i
tion would Droceed without delay to a regular ization of debt
l'
payments." Soon after they entered office. President Harding
and Secretary Llellon proceeded to carry out these pledges. In
June, 1921, Mr. Mellon sought from Congress "full powers for
dealing with the war debts." Congress refused to grant such
powers to the Treasury. Then Congress, in 1922, authorized a
World '.Var Foreign Debt Commission to negotiate debt settlements
with our debtor countries. Certain principles were laid down to'
guide the American representatives in the fmding of these ob-
ligations to the best interest of this country,
j Of the twenty nations which were debtors to the United
States because of loans advanced from April, 1917, to November, i
1920, the Debt-Funding Commission negotiated agreements with
thirteen governments. In these negotiations it was necessary toi
depart radically from the principles of the debt-funding act.
Congress had specified, in the act creating the Debt-Funding
Commission, that arrangements should be made for the payment of
the whole indebtedness within twenty-five years. In January,
1923, British representatives in Washington protested to the
1. Moulton and Pasvolsky, War Debts and Y/orld Prosperity ; p. 71.

15
Commission that it was impossible for their government to arrange
for payment within this period* These representatives also
^
protested against the charge of 4t per cent interest, authorized j|
by Congress, for the market rate had fallen to about 3^ per cent.
The Commission gave ground on these points. It approved, as
\
terras of settlement, the funding of the entire principal and the!
i,
entire unpaid interest (amounting, in the case of Great Britain, i;
to about $4,600 million) over a period of 62 years * For the !|
first ten years the rate of interest was designated at 3 per cen^;
and 3^ per cent for the remaining 52 years.
The American Commission, in approving these terms, exceeded
its authority. It was obliged to ask Congress for an amendment.
;
This amendment, passed in February, 1923, conferred far greater
|discretionary powers upon the Commission, besides providing for
I;
the enlarging of that body to eight members under the Chairman- II
ship of the Secretary of the Treasury, (The original Commission,
was made up of five members under the Chairmanship of the Secre-
j
tary of the Treasury.) After the granting of larger powers, the!
r
Commission proceeded to formulate, as the basis of future fund-
ing agreements, the principle of "capacity to pay." An announce
ment of this policy was incorporated in a statement the Commis-
sion issued in October, 1925, in referring to the French nego-
tiations. An interpretation of this principle is found in the
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the year end-
,
• Foreign Policy Association; vol. Ill; Special Supplement, no.l
The United States and the vVar Debts; p. 16.
I
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ing June 30, 1925: " the adjustments made with each Govern-
ment must be measured by the ability of the particular Govern-
ment to put aside and transfer to the United States the payments
called for under the funding agreement Nor does the princi-
ple of capacity to pay require the foreign debtor to pay to the
full limit of his present or future capacity. It must be per-
mitted to preserve and improve its economic position, to bring
its budget into balance and to place its finances and currency
on a sound basis, and to maintain, and if possible improve the
standard of living of its citizens. No settlement which is
oppressive and retards the recovery and development of the
foreign debtor is to the best interest of the United States or
1
I of Europe."
The common characteristics of the debt-funding agreements
with the various European countries are:
j
"1. Financial clauses which fix the total amount of the
funded indebtedness, the interest rate and the annuities the
debtor government will be required to pay.
2. The distribution of these annuities over a period of
sixty- two years.
3. The use of bonds payable to the United States on the
part of the debtor government. These bonds are exempt from tax-
ation by the foreign government, and the United States has the
privilege of exchanging them with the debtor governments for
ll. Quoted on page 17, Foreign Policy Association; vol. Ill;
I
Special Supplement, no.l; The United States and the War
Debts.
31
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marketable obligations."
The obligations of the foreign governments held by the
United States Treasury were "in the form of ordinary commercial
notes bearing interest for the most part at the rate of 5 per
2
cent." Before the funding of these debts, all the interest
which had accrued our Treasury had entered on the books at their
original rates. At the beginning of the debt-funding negotia-
tions the debtor governments had outstanding against them a total
I
obligation comprising the original amount, with the interest |l
Iwhich had accrued for a few years. At the time of the first debt
settlement the interest rate was established at 4:^ per cent by
!the American Commission. In the latest agreements the inter-
est rate was set at 3 per cent for the first ten years, and 5i
per cent for the remaining 52 years. Bearing in mind these re-
jductions in interest rates, one should grasp readily the
enormous concessions made to our debtors.
"On a 5 per cent basis, the extent of reduction works out
lat approximately 30 per cent for Great Britain and for six
:co\intries - Finland, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Esthonia, and
Lithuania - which negotiated settlements based substantially on
the British model. For Czechoslovakia and Rotiraania, the curtail-
ment is about 37 per cent; for Belgium and France about 60 per
ijcent; for Greece about 72 per cent; for Austria about 74 per
cent; for Yugoslavia about 76 per cent; and for Italy it is a
|1. Ibid
2. Ibid; p. 15.
ii
18
fraction over 80 per cent. For all the debtors combined the ex-
1
tent of cancellation works out at slightly over 51 per cent,"
||
Substantial reductions as these serve to furnish ammunition for
the arguments of those who oppose the complete cancellation of
!the war debts.
However, one student of the debt situation warns us that
general prices now are much lower than the period the wap debts
were contracted and the "proceeds spent." The value of money, in
other words, is higher. "if we choose to consider not the nom-
inal money totals of the debts, but the real economic burdens
iwhich they entail, the decline in prices (or the rise in value oJ(
money) has therefore offset more than four-fifths of the average
|reduction granted by the United States; and in the case of Great
Britain and certain other countries, the remaining real burden
has actually been increased. This change in real burdens,
jBimilar to that which now confronts Germany, is one from which
all debtors suffer in times of declining prices. It is signifi-
cant that under such circumstances what the debtor loses the
2
creditor gains."
1, Moulton and Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Prosperity ; pp.100,
101.
2. James W, Angell, Foreign Policy Reports ; Vol. VII, no. 4; April 29,
1951; "Reparations and The Inter-Ally Debts in 1931"; p. 97.
y. •.
CHAPTER II
REPRESENTATIVE VIEWPOINTS ON THE DEBT PROBLEM
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A well-knovirn writer^ on economic su^bjects derides the
attempts of the so-called "internationalists" (who favor debt
cancellation) to prove "by sound logic of economics that coraplete
cancellation would result in the stimulation of world trade,
leading the way, therefore, to world economic recovery. He
cites as examples of reriresentati ve opinion among the can-
cellati onists, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, the late Magnus W»
Alexander, the president of the National Industrial Conference
Soard, Senator Borah, the "foreign Policy Association, and
alludes to the stand, also, of the puhlications of the American
2
"federation of Labor,"'
He readily admits that only by the exchange of goods can
debts bet'^een governments be paid in the end, for, if a country
over a long period imports more than she exports, she will find
herself in economic difficulties, since the supply of gold owned
by the richest countries does not compare with the value of its
trade. Because so many countries are off the gold standard the
world is suffering for the scarcity of stable money with which
to trade. It cannot be argued, though, that this conditions is
due to payments on the war debts. In the central banks of the
worlds he points out, there is gold enough to do many times the
1, Samuel Crowther
2. Samuel Crowther, The Saturday Evening Post (Dec, 10, 1932),
"The Latest War Debt HoaxT"' np, 58, 60,
'

amount of "business done at the present tine. These "banks are
hoarding that gold, for they fear that, if once in the hands of
their citizens, the gold would leave the country, or "be removed
fro.Q governxTient control. The League of Nations gold delegation
in a majority renort, would not recognize that war dehts and
reparations constituted r naior cause in the breaking down of
the !nonetary system of the world. On the policies of the
central "banks of the world the MacMillan Comfnittee of Great
Britain placed the responsibility for :^alling prices, "'^
The derangement of world currencies, he claims, stands
out as one of the major hindrances to a proper resumption of
world trade; that the cancellation of debts and reparations
would be only a minor factor in the stabilization of monetary
systems, and, therefore, in the stimulation of world trade.
If no recop-nized body of experts has concluded that the fall
of prices and the upsetting of money systems have been due to
war debts and reparations, how, he asks, can this difficulty
2be remedied by the canceling of them^
Cancellati onists, he states, compare our foreign trade to-
day with the period of foreign trade ending in 1929, and then
assert that the decrease of a few billion dollars in trade be-
tween these dates measures the exatft business we lost because
of our debt and tariff policies. He admits the enormous drop
1, Ibid, pp, 58, 60
2. Ibid, p. 60
I
I!

In trade, but justly hints that such comparisons are not fair,
for the figures are in dollars. The tonnage itself, though,
has not decreased as dollar figures would indicate. It is not
80 niuch the loss of tonnage that concerns the world as the loss
of profits. If those who produce and carry the amount of
goods now involved in world trade could receive a profit on
these goods, there would he much less complaint about the con-
dition of the world's markets,"^
In his conclusions our spokesman against cancellation
contends that debt cancellation would close the export markets
of the world to the United States, instead of o^^en them, until
we should lower our standards of living "to a competitive
basis," Debt cancellations, instead of widening our trade in
exports, would change our position in world competition to
such a degree that we should be forced to make drastic tariff
increases (to the point, in some cases, of absolute prohibi-
tions on imports) in order to protect our home market,
2
Another individual who is obviously strongly opposed
to the cancellation of the war debts attempts to show that
certain debtor nations are in a position to pay the United
States, He states that it has never been proved that those
war-time allies of the United States were not able to pay in
1, Ibid
2. Bainbridge Colby, part of the time Secretary of State
in the Wilson cabinet.

accordance with the generous debt settlements.
He proceeds to refer to the loans the French sovernment
has advanced to foreign nations since the end of the war . Even
excluding the loan to Czechoslovakia of 600,000,000 francs,
made as recently as January 20, 1932, a loan of 300,000,000
francs to Finland, and one to the Polish railroads of
400,000,000 francs, France has loaned a total of 13,277,000,000
francsj To Roumania she is reported to have advanced as high
as 2,090,000,000 francs. In addition to the railway loan to
Poland, France has hel-oed that nation to the extent of the sum
of 2,000,000,000 francs. To Turkey she has advanced
770,000,000 francs, and to China 23,000,000 francs. The
question is asked, "Can the plea of France, that she is unable
to repay the money borrowed from us since the close of the war,
be expected to move us orof oundly , in the light of these
facts?"^
The economic ills, he a^^serts, through which the world
is passing are not attributable to Europe's war debts to us,
in any appreciable degree. He calls attention to the fact
that since January, 1931, nothing has been paid on the debt
account (his speech was reported in a May, 1932, publication);
1, Bainbridge Colby, Proceedings of Academy of Political
3ci ence
; vol, XV; pJay , 1932); " Sh oul d War Debts Be
Cancelled? pp , 69-70.
2. Ibid
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that the rapid increase of the financial distress of the world
may "be considered to have occurred after that date, in which
nothing was paid. Again, in dealing with the capacity of
debtor nations to pay, he states that the suin of .^'215,000,000
paid to the United States on war de"bt3, as the last payment
prior to January, 1931, represented about one-half of one per
cent of the estimated na.tional incomes of those countries
which contributed to that T3ayment, and but 2,7 per cent of
their annual budgets. For armaments they spend eight times as
much as they are required to pay us on the account of war
debts. The payments amount to 1,1 per cent of the entire vol-
ume of the exnort trade of these debtor nations. Such a per-
centage would not exercise a "disturbing effect" or "appre-
ciable influence" upon world trade,
There is, admittedly, one claim that should be differ-
entiated from those that have been dinned constantly into the
ears of the American public, namely, the contention that be-
cause of the fall in the general price level of goods, the
debtor nations* obligations are greater than those undertaken
at the time the loans were advanced. In answering this he
contends there are "other variables" equally as deserving' of
2
consideration - such as the "capacity to pay,"
1, Ibid; pp, 70, 71
2, Ibid
= =
P.4
I
Another able writer on international subjects also
argues against the contention of e.nncellationic ts that the war
^) ^ debts stand as a barrier to international recuperation. He
I
points out that during the period of the Hoover .-noratorium the
European nations, instead of strai ;;;htening out their financial
condition, became more deeply involved in financial diffi-
culties. For instance, ^^reat Britain went off the gold stand-
j ard, France, better off economically, faced a problem in
resnect to her budget - a state of affairs due to extravagance,
I
Today Prance stands out as comparatively well off econom-
ically. Her climb to world financial power has been rapid in
recent years. She enjoys a solvency which is denied many other
outstanding "Euro^iean powers. France he charges with financial
I
imperialism. The old imperialism of Napoleon has been revived
j
by means of political - financial domination of a large part
of Europe, Poincare and his successors have stii ren to gain
j
power for France through financial aid to states who become
'i
2
ji subserviant to her will. Under this policy the loans are
made, as a rule, on the basis of defensive cooperation.
The anti-cancellation spokesmen above-reviewed apparently
1, Isaac F, Ilarcosson
2, Specific loans have been cited from Mr, Colby *s dis-
cussion,
;>) m 3. Isaac F, Marcosson, The Saturday Evening Post ; (Dec, 24,
' 1932); ^'Gentlemen Agy66" ; t)p, 3, 5b,
*
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stress too much the present status of the deTDtor nations in-
volved. They fail to consider the problem as a whole. At
present the world is only a short period of time away from
the "beginning of the depression. Certain resources which were
plentiful during the so-called peak of prosperity have been
stretched out to hridge over the lean years. But there is a
limit to the stretching process, Each government, as with in-
stitutions in general, is hearing up bravely in its fiscal
problems, in the hope that each new year will witness the turn
of the economic tide. The more difficult the general situation
grows - and it continues to be aggravated in the absence of
steps which might be inaugurated for recovery by the concert
of the nations of the globe - the more impoverished peoples
become. Then follows the lowering of income, with the attend-
ant loss of purchasing po\^er. National incomes, consequently,
diTiinish, The question is, therefore, what will be the status
of the debtor nations in the future - even the near future -
if the nations plead poverty now? Shall we bleed them finan-
cially now, and remove even the possibility of future payments,
if our government persists in its policy of regular payments?
Modification attitudes towards the war debts seem to be
little in the way of concrete proposals - the entire problem
is so stupendous, Most opinion on this subject narrows down
to general princir^les which may be sum
- ed up under the head-
ings: (1) An indefinite debt moratorium, depending on world
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econoniic recovery ; General capacity to pay , with present and
future prosperity of the nations in question to he judged; and
(3) A consideration of the various changes in price levels, at
the tine the loans were made and the present, through each
succeeding annual pa^^ment in the future,
A numher of American men of affairs have intimated that -
"before it is too late - the United States should use the war
dehts as a "lever" to hring about the settlement of certain
European prohlens - political as well as economic, such as
disarmament and reparations. One^ claims that the ""bargaining
power" of the debts is lessening as the months pass; that the
question is not so much as to whether we shall keep or lose
250 million a year, "but whether we shall use the "leverage"
1, "The attitude, as expressed in a letter written "by Carter
Glass, then Secretary of the Treasury, in Decem"ber, 1919,
was that until normal economic life was resumed in Europe
an attempt to collect from our de"btors would 'decrease
their ultimate capacity to pay their debt to us,'" (Quoted
from F, W, "better, The North American Review (TTovember,
1932); "Capacity to Pay," p, 412.
2, The same author attempts to define what he holds to be the
true meaning of "ca-oacity to pay." He says: "A country's
carjacity to pay a foreign debt is based fundamentally on
the willingness of its people to stand taxation, and the
ability of the administration to stay in oower if it adonts
an unpopular policy. In the case of government debts
there is no such thing as 'capacity to pay,' separate and
apart from willingness to pay." p. 414,'
3, 'It, Shemard :iorgan, who has served as Vice President of
the Chase National Bank of New York,
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they give us, in good season, to affect the settleraent of
vexing European prohlems that , once settled, would contribute
toward general world recovery. Another"^ reminds us of polit-
ical chstacles in the way of these settlements; that high
officials of one country which has a financial problem to
settle with another country often are handicapped (although
personally hroad-ininded in jud^-ment) by the narrow attitude of
2
the taxpayers they remrepent,
3
A modif icati onist who speaks for the agricultural inter-
ests of the 2iiddle west contends that wheat, even more than
steel, is the "barometer of trade"; that it reflects farm
health better than anything else; and that a remedy for the
wheat problem would be a cure for all nrobleras. This gentle-
man conducted a .nost interesting experiment v/ith a wheat graph.
It registered various world economic and -nolitical conditions
or events. But none of these was "coincident with" the major
movements in wheat prices.
Later he had occasion to draw up a gold export and gold
Import graoh. This graph revealed a decided relationship be-
tween the movement of gold to and from America and the price of
wheat,' Tith few exceptions, the great wheat-price movements
1, Mr, Eliot Wadsworth, formerly Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury and Secretarj^ of the United States World War
Foreign Debt Funding Cominission,
2, Proceedings of Academy of Political Science ; Vol. XV; (May,
1332); "The Political A-spects of War Debts and Reparations";
pp. 106-107,
3, Mr, Charles C, Isely, a lumber and grain merchant of Dodge
City, Kansas; a distinguished citizen of that state.

2B=
took place vj'ithout relation to crop news or grain shipments.
On the fshipinent of fold to the United States, invariatly wheat
suffered a drop in price. To this individual the modification
of the present dett settlement would mean the reniovcil of an
artificial harrier that hinders the restoration of wheat to its
former position, AtA wheat, he claims, can lead the procession
to "better times,
^
An outstanding authority"^ on world economic conditions
presents his reasons for a modification policy, Ke points out
that although America's motiven for fighting in the World War
were less ccmpelling than those of France that America did have
interests. The United States profited hy developing a "fuller
sense of nationhood," and "by est a'bli shing for herself a "place
of great influence and authority in world affairs." The domi-
nant motive, though, was to save Europe and France. Thus, the
countries who fought together in the war were engaged in a
common cause; they v;ere "partners with unequal interests,"
This alone, he admits, cannot suppcrt a claim for complete can-
cellation," hut it does suggest modification of the original
3
agreements,
1 1, Charles C. Isely, Proceedings of Academy of Political
I
Scier.ce
; (a^y, 1332); "Political Dehts of All Nations and
Their Relation to Deioressed Agriculture," pp. 78-83.
2. Sir Arthur Salter, foriaerly Director of the Economic and
Finance Section of the League of ITations, He has heen in
a position, as few men have, to ohserve world conditions
from the international viewpoint.
Sir Arthur Salter, K.C.3., Recovery ; The Second Effort,
p. 179 ^
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He, too, epulis attention to the fact that the loane raised
in America vere used to -nurchase supplies there; that this
spending served to contribute to the economic prosperity of the
United States, and, as a consequence, part of the profits went
into the Treasury through the channels of taxation. Because of
war demand leading to a scarcity of certain supplies, prices
were inflated to a higher level than tv;ice the pre-war or
present level. If the debtor country paid in full, therefore,
it would be "paying more than twice in real value in goods and
services, what it received, in addition to interest, itself
similarly more than doubled in value and burden,"''" Thus our
esteemed British friend pleads for modification from the stand-
point of the com.ion cause argument, of the profits derived by
Americans in war contracts, and of the changes in general price
levels.
1. Ibid; p. 180

CHAPTER III
THE SHIPJffiNT OF GOODS OR THE SELLING OF SERVICES BY
OUR DEBTOR NATIONS NECESSARY IF DEBTS ARE TO BE PAID
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CHAPTER III
An individual with simply an elemental knowledge of econom-
ics knows that a nation paying huge suras of money to another
nation does not draw that money "out of the air«" That money
must be accumulated through the process of constructive effort.
He realizes that if annual payments over a long period of time on
a particular debt are made out of national taxation, without the
business interests of that nation having recourse to a generous
volume of world trade, national impoverishment will set in*
(There has to be some way in which money is brought into that
country - if that nation is to continue to pay out to other
nations* The inevitable conclusion is that the payment of these
debts depends on the ultimate shipment of goods or the selling of
services to the creditor country, or some country receiving the
currency of the creditor country.
Up until the World War the larger part of American exports
was carried to world ports in the vessels of foreign registry*
Great Britain, for example, profited well by sharing in a large
portion of this carrying trade* In fact, not a small part of her
national income is derived from the selling of her services in
world trade* But, since the V^orld War our increased national
jconsciousness, apparently, has led to agitation for the building
up of our own merchant marine* Business leaders probably saw a
|chance to make a few more dollars. Our high governmental
Ijofficials concluded it was a patriotic duty to make ourselves
ij
self-sufficient in the carrying trade; that America should regain

her one-time proud position of possessing a merchant marine of
importance. The United States government has seen fit to experi-
ment in the subsidizing of various American steamship lines. The
cry has been for a merchant marine independent of other nations,
in case of war; national safety and our place in the sun demand
it. Our shipping interests have succeeded to a marked degree in
building up a carrying service that has reduced, greatly, the
|
activity of other nations in this field - particularly Great
Britain. Therefore, the chance of debtor nations to earn
American dollars from this source has been almost eliminated.
Again, before the late war, immigration to the United Statet
was comparatively unrestricted. Hundreds of thousands of for-
eigners entered our shores annually. The steamship lines of for-i
eign nations which engaged in transporting these immigrants added,
thereby, to their earnings. Over here in the United States,
these immigrants sent remittances in American money to their
European relatives, making possible one source of American
dollars to the debtor nations. Post-\var trends decreed tliat this
Enrestricted immigration be limited. A new immigration policy
as advanced by the party in pov/er in Washington. Legislation
ollowed that narrovfed the once-tremendous stream of humanity
which sought better living conditions in a land proclaimed as
"flowing with milk and honey" to proportions that seem negligible
in comparison. The transportation of immigrants to the United
States for a few years now has been an almost profitless under-
taking, as compared to the days before the new immigration laws.

We are obliged to rule out this field of service and possible
means of gaining American dollars - that is, of any consequence J
by our debtor nations.
There remains yet, though, one other source of American
dollars, aside from the shipment of goods. Unlike the carrying
trade and the transport of immigrants - experiencing their hal-
cyon days before the war in relation to the United States - the
travel of American tourists on foreign strands tended to increase
after the war. Evidently the unprecedented movement of troops
from our coixntry to Europe during the war and the consequent
closer political and trade relations with our allies stimulated
the desire on the part of Americans for world travel. It might
not be out of place to draw a parallel with the Crusades. Our
soldiers on returning from new lands - with their fascinating
modes of living and natural wonders - no doubt gained the inter-
est of those at home by accounts of their travels. These, in
turn, became desirous of seeing for themselves the various
places and peoples described. Then there are those among the
wealthier classes who travel just for the change, the possible
recreation it may afford. They spend freely, as a rule, in the
shops. All classes of tourists are obliged to spend for trans-
portation and for food and shelter. The transportation lines of
jthese foreign countries have employed every means to induce
Americans to travel abroad. Competition among these lines has
been particularly keen. The business resulting from the presence
of Americans abroad has been especially lucrative since the war.

-S3
Before the depression it was estimated that income to Exiropeans
from American tourists reached a mark as high as hundreds of
millions of dollars annually. It is only during the past two or
three years that this tourist activity has dropped off materially
This source of American dollars has been reduced, and is being
reduced increasingly fast.
Since services in the carrying trade between foreign
nations and the United States and services in the transportation
of iimnigrants between the same countries have been so reduced as
to no longer figure as a source of American dollars to our debtoi
nations, and the expenditures of iimerican tourists have so de-
creased as to :e a negligible factor, there is only one source ol
American money which remains. These debtor governments must be
able to sell goods to the United States or to the rest of the
world . In other words, their ability to pay is contingent on
world trade. Common sense dictates such a conclusion.
The peoples of these debtor nations must sell something more
than they ordinarily would sell; they must accumulate, either
directly or indirectly, more dollars than would be necessary
under the condition of owing no debt to the United States. An
alternative is to buy less of the world »s goods, or consume less
than usual!" A surplus which can be converted into dollars for
payment must be available. If they resort to the alternative of
buying less goods of the world, they are faced with the undesir-
1. National Industrial Conference Board, The Inter-Ally Debts
and the United States
, p. 106.

able possibility of lowering their present or future standards
of living. Such a course, most assuredly, would tend to hinder
world economic recovery.

CHAPTER IV
TARIFF BARRIERS SET UP BY THE UNITED STATES

•CHAPTER IV
We state that our debtor countries must accumulate American
dollars with which to repay the loans we advanced hy the selling
of goods to the United States or the rest of the world. Theo-
retically such a course works out admirably well» What is the
practical side of the point under consideration? We are forced
to face the lamentable fact that under present conditions the
shipment of goods for American constimption is limited - decidedly
limited. (And here we meet a problem that is world-wide in scope.
In other words, the United States has resorted to the setting up
of tariff barriers.
Numerous writers have pointed out the naked truth that the
United States, while insisting on the payment of the war debts,
have turned around and set up tariff walls to make the accumu-
r
lation of American dollars in necessary amounts well-nigh im-
possible by debtor governments! Senator Borah, in speaking be-
•
fore a crowded Senate on May 5, 1932, reminded the American
people that the United States virtually has refused to accept
goods in payment through the operation of her tariff policy^.
One writer states: "The strain which these payments produce
is not only the strain of raising the payments, but also the
strain of transmitting the proceeds to the United States. The
high American protective tariff makes it difficult for the
European debtors to sell their products - chiefly manufactured
goods - directly to our markets; and the general high level of
1. Contemporary Review (June. 1932) . " Poreisn AfriLirs^ " p. 792.

the existing tariffs in many other parts of the world makes the
whole problem of profitable exportation much more difficult than
it was before the war.""^
Another writer realizes that we can throw good money after
badj "as spending two dollars to collect one, which as everybody
knows is not a remunerative operation. Also there is such a
thing as behaving toward your customers who owe you money and
cannot pay, in such a manner and spirit as to make them not only
default on their bills but take their trade elsewhere. Nobody
who depends for his livelihood upon the good will and continued
trade of a great community, or a little one either, can afford
to do that; yet up to now that is the general atmosphere of the
war debt situation as a whole. Moreover by our tariff policy we
have made almost impossible payments in the only form in which
2
our debtors can make them "
Other writers advance similar views. Says one, "V/e as a
people hastened to increase our stake in Europe by billions of
dollars but meanwhile we erected barbed v/ire entanglements
against the trade of those v/ho owed us m.oney. When the year
1930 dawned, we began to get rude practical demonstrations of
the erroneousness of our method. Retaliatory tariff barriers
commenced to appear..... 'I venture the statement,* said Mr.
Young, 'that we shall have to reduce competitive trade barriers
!• James W. Angell, Foreign Policy Reports
, vol. VII, no. 4,
(April 29, 1951), "Reparations and the Inter-Ally Debts in
1951," pp. 95,96.
2. John Palmer Garit, Graphic Survey (Nov. 1, 1952), "Of V/ar
Debts and Other Menaces," p. 556.

to preserve the world* a sanity.*"
I
Still another denounces the tariff policies of the world in
stating that "it is an obvious fact that tariffs, especially
when all nations impose them and retaliate, hamper trade and com-
plicate 'exchange*. How can the United States insist on repay-
ment of the war debts, interest and principal, and try to prevoat
2
the only real payment, which is in goods?"
I Foreign debt authorities as Dr. Max \nfinkler and Maxwell S.
Stewart join the list of those who strongly air their views on
this subject: "Aside from gold payments and the possibility of
securing new credits, debtor nations can meet their obligations
only through the export of goods or by services. But, as is the
case in regard to gold and credits, the policy of the United
States and Prance, as well as other creditor nations, has tended
to make repayment by these methods difficult. Tariffs have been
raised continually in this country and abroad, with the avowed
object of keeping out foreign goods as much as possible. The
result has been a marked restriction in foreign trade, and a
tendency to overproduction, behind tariff walls."
,
After we began to tinker with our tariffs, following the
war, other nations began to raise their tariffs - more generally
the war debtor governments. They were really obliged to fight
1. Editorial, The Commonweal (Nov. 23, 1932), "Getting to the
Bottom, " pp. 85,86
2. Edward T. Hoot, The Christian Century (Nov. 30, 1932), "Can
We Afford to Be Paid?" p. 1468
3. Foreign Policy Reports
«
vol. VII, no. 22, (Jan. 6, 1932),
•Tlecent Defaults of Government Loans," pp. 397-398.
(
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for increased exports, in order to secure the money of creditor
nations. This condition tended to bring on a "competition of
receding prices." At the same time the increase in tariff
barriers lowered the amount of imports as well as exports. The
lesson the United States should have learned - that nations
which cannot sell are in no position to buy - apparently has not
been properly recognized. The decrease in trade, the fall in
prices, combined with increased tariffs, reacted unfavorably on
each other.^
Mr. Bernhard Ostralenk, author of numerous works on econom-
ic subjects, also points out that the Americans have not recog-
nized the principle that we must import more than we export;
that we insist on the payment of the debt in full, yet we set up
tariff obstacles that prevent payment in full. He claims that
on two occasions the tariffs have been raised deliberately to
narrow down imports, imposing greater burdens on the already-
2 !
suffering debtor nations endeavoring to make payment. '
j
Mr. E. P. Gay, another author on economic subjects, falls in
line with the rest in submitting his observations on our tariff
policy: "'Ahat has especially aggravated the European feeling
about the war debts has been the American tariff. This has been
held responsible for the relative decline in the imports from
the European debtors to the United States. Supplementary causes
1. C. T, Revere, Review of Reviews { January, 19o3), "War Debts and
Commodity Prices," pp. 33,34.
2. Current History (January, 1933) , "The Dilemma of the Y/ar Debt^"
p. 418 ,
(
•^6
may be foiind for the general decline in the imports of European
commodities into the Uhited States from the 48 per cent total
imports in 1915 to the 30 per cent of recent years But the
fact remains that the narrowly nationalistic policy of the
United States, as exemplified again in the tariff of 1930 - in-
excusable from an economic point of view and definitely harmful
from a broader national standpoint - has been one of the great
complicating and accelerating factors in the cumulation of ab-
nonnal balances and rigidities which brought the world to the
1
Great Depression."
It would be impossible to present a more distinguished,
recognized authority on the American tariff question than Mr.
Cordell Hull (now Secretary of State), who states that the world
trade this year (statement made in 1932) should be more than
$50,000,000,000 on the basis of the "pre-war rate of increase."
Instead, this trade will be less than the "relatively trifling"
amount of $15,000,000,000, He says that one can hardly imagine
the "heavy network of tariff and other obstructions and Impedi-
ments," at the present, that stand in the way of the "transfer
of capital, goods and services across international frontiers."
Such transfers should be largely profitable to all concerned.
Every country, he continues, is loaded with surpluses which
other countries can use; that because of this "drying up of
world markets and world trade" the debtor nations cannot pay
1. Foreign Affairs (July, 1932), "The Great Depression," p. 540.
I
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their debts in services or goods - preventing them now from
either going back to the gold standard or, in some other way,
making stable their monetary situation.-^
"Doubtless the American tariff is an obstacle to the estab-
lishment of a favorable balance of trade by Great Britain with
America; but, right or wrong, it has long been the American
theory - now apparently accepted and practiced by all the other
countries too, including Great Britain - that tariffs are
necessary to give a home market for our home industries."^
In the winter of 1929-19o0 the League of Nations made an
attempt to bring about freer trade. A Conference was called to
draw up a treaty for a "Tariff Truce" for a period of time that
would allov/ for the preparation of an "ambitious" plan of
"actual reduction." All nations received an invitation to this
conference. It finally narrov/ed down to a European conference.
The direct results were slight. The convention drav/n up failed
of ratification. The same conference endeavored to put through
a convention to "remove 'prohibitions' and to secure 'Equal
Treatment for Foreigners.'" But these efforts failed. However,
these attempts were not devoid of some good results. It is a
fact that during these years the major increases in industrial
tariffs were made by those governments outside Europe which did
not take part in this conference.^
1. Senator Gordell Hull (Tennessee), The Literary Digest Politi -
cal Cyclopedia , "Tariff and Commercial Policy," p. 165.
2. Editorial, The Christian Century (Dec. 14,1952) , "The Debts
are Part of a Larger Problem," p. 1552.
5. Sir Arthur Salter, Recovery; The Second Effort
, p. 203.
I'
I
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other authorities who have devoted special study to econom-|
ic trends might be added to those already reviewed to support the
judgment that the United States, while insisting on full debt
j
payment, is closing the door to the shipment of goods from debtor
nations by the setting up of trade barriers in the form of high .
tariffs. In many cases tariffs deliberately have been raised on
goods from these countries, our government aware that these
nations must build up a surplus of exports, must procure American
dollars.''" Is it little wonder that those men who have been re-
ferred to have spoken in no uncertain terms? We Americans pride
ourselves on our idealism, yet we would permit our fr^overnment,
for the sake of a narrow, selfish, nationalistic policy, to bar
the way to a certain measure of world recovery through trade
channels. Surely our representatives and senators in Washington
realize that the tariff walls for which they are really respon-
1. Between 1920 and 1925 our leaders in political life were
anxious as to the outcome of the debtor nations* endeavors to
liquidate their debts. It was feared that our markets might
I
be "flooded by goods with costs based on depreciated curren-
I
cies." ""0 ward off any such possibility our Congress passed
|i the Fordney-McCumber tariff, which was signed by President
Harding in September, 1922. This move virtually inforraed the
world that the war debt payments to the United States could
not be made by shipment of goods.
C. T. Revere, Review of Reviews (January, 1933), '"A'ar Debts
and Commodity Prices," pp. 53-34
.
In 1950, Congress passed the Hawley-Smoot tariff measure,
which raised the general level of tariff rates.
Sir Arthur Salter points out that this tariff was a "turn-
ing-point in world history," for it served to "check Just the
extra imports which the normal correcting process (that is,
the proper amo\int of imports for creditor countries) is
I
bringing in."
I
Sir Arthur Salter, Recovery; The Second .biffort
,
p. 198.
f<
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sible serve to retard, to a serious extent, the normal flow of
trade between America and her numerous debtor governments* Must
we conclude that the international viewpoint - mutual regard for
the interests of all nations and peoples - is, in our land,
sacrificed to the industrial interests? Impartial observers
would concede unhesitatingly the point that the United States anc
her debtor governments would derive mutual gain by a downward re-
vision of the tariff. Every nation of the globe of any conse-
quence would have to enter into any scheme of revision for the
success of such an undertaking.
A movement is now under way to strive to achieve this goal,
for President Roosevelt, on April 12, 1933, while making his
first speech on the subject of foreign affairs, appealed to the
nations of the American hemisphere to support a movement to re-
duce artificial barriers to world trade. He states: "It is of
vital importance to every nation of this continent that the
American governments, individually, take without further delay
such action as may be possible to abolish all unnecessary and
artificial barriers and restrictions which now hamper the health^
flow of trade between the peoples of the American republics."
On the same day the representatives of 42 foreign govern-
ments dispatched from Washington cablegrams to their home offices
containing the invitation of the United States government to dis-
cuss, through diplomatic channels, their views on world problems!
1. From an account of the address of President Roosevelt, before
the governing board of the Pan-American Union, in Washington,
as reported in The Boston Herald
,
April 13, 1933; p. 3.

CHAPTER V
THE DEBTOR NATIONS MUST
THE UNITED STiO'ES, AS
PRESENT
EXPORT MORE THAN THE! IMPORT
CREDITOR, MUST REVERSE HKR
TRADE POLICY
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CHAPTER V
In the final analysis of the inter-governmental debt com-
plications we are obliged to agree with the statement that inter-
>
national debts the size of the present war debts cannot be paid
unless the debtor nations export more than they import . For any
debtor nation to attempt to pay a foreign creditor nation such
sums, as involved in the present war debts, from its gold supply
would spell ruin to its monetary system and generally disorganize
its economic stability. Payments to foreign governments must be
made in foreign exchange, procurable only by the selling of goods
to the foreigners involved or by the selling of services. It is '
obvious that any nation, in order to maintain its proper economic
life, must have a surplus of exports to cover its purchases of
necessary imports. Hov/ much greater this surplus of exports
should be if huge war debts are to be paid in full;
j The debtor nations fully understand that their exports must
be greater than their imports, if the war debts are to be paid.
\\ith the avenues of trade so restricted that these nations are
unable to accuir.ulate a surplus of dollars, they have resortec' to
the curtailment of their imports. If their exports m.aintain
their present volume, their imports might so diminish that ex-
ports gradually v/ould exceed the imports. Thus a national sur-
plus would be built up for debt pajrments. But national con-
sumption could be so reduced, as would be the case if imports de-
creased to a great extent, that the standards of living of whole
nations would be lowered. This situation, no doubt, would tend
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further to retard the trade essential for world economic well-
"being,
Fow the payment of the wslt dehts Involves extraordinary
difficulties for the creditor nations as well as the debtors.
Since the world's gold supply would cover less than one-h&lf
these war debts, the debtors, as has been pointed out already,
[can pay the United States only in goods and services. The gold
supply in the central banks of forty-five countries up to the
end of 1932 has been estimated as ^11,000,000,000, Of this
amount the United States holds over 54,000,000,000,"'' The inevi-
table conclusion follows that if the United States recognizes
that her debtors can pay her only in goods and services, she mus ;
imrtort more than she exports
.
The very thought of such a radical,
departure from her historical r^osition staggers one. Such a move
would mean a reversal of the American economic system. For a fe'ir
o
decades we have enjoyed a favorable balance of trade," Our in-
dustries have been rostered by orotective tariffs, American
business has displayed agr^ressi veness in penetrating the markets
of the four corners of the globe. Exports, up to the time of th(
!
present slump, were on the increase.
The question has been raised as to whether insistence on th(i
payment of the debts would present the necessity of great change s
in the economic life of the debtor nations - providing the United
1, Eernhard Ostralenk, Current History (January, 1933), "The
Dilerama of the War Debts," p. 417,
2, Between 1370 and 1880 our exports began to exceed our imports,
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States reversed her policy of an excess of exports over Imports.
Would such a step cause the debtor nations to force exports "be-
yond their economic limits in order to obtain adequate surpluses'
that they may "buy dollar exchange" with which to pay their
debts?"^ Would our creditor countries be capable of holding up
their end of the deal?
I
Would it be possible for debtor nations to gain dollars
indirectly? The suggestion has been made that Great Britain may
not have to export a surplus to the United States; that payment^
may be made indirectly. For example. Great Britain might sell
manufactured goods to Brazil. The surplus of exports to Brazil
from Great Britain would be used to pay for those goods imported
from Brazil into the United States* This system has been worked
out. The fact still remains that the debts would have to be
paid by goods. Such a system would necessitate the reduction of
American exports to Brazil because of the increased British ex-
ports to that country. Brazil would gain the favorable balance
of trade, instead of Great Britain. This method leads to but
the shifting of the favorable balance of trade. United States
would still be faced with the necessary step of importing more
2
than she exports.
I
Most peculiar is the position of the United States as a
creditor nation. Y/e cam.e out of the war as the outstanding
creditor nation in all history. Yet we were so situated as to
1. Ibid; p. 417
2. Ibid; p. 418

be unfitted to play our part as the great creditor nation. Our |
role dictates that we should be "intrinsically situated to be a
;
buyer of the products of other nations" that they may not only
replay our loans to them but that they may also be able to buy
1
essential goods.
(It is of interest to note that if Great Britain had emerged
from the late war as the chief creditor nation, she would have
offered markets "for all varieties of foodstuffs and raw
materials." Only a small portion of these foodstuffs and raw
2
materials is raised v/ithin the limits of her territory.)
( The matter of "exchange" presents a serious problem in the
transfer of goods in international trade. Were it necessary for
foreign importers to ship gold in payment, they would be obliged
to pay both freight and insurance. Since some of their own
citizens have sold goods to importers in the United States, there
|
is approximately an equal transfer on both sides. These obli-
gations can then be "exchanged by 'drafts' at par, since the ad-
vantage is mutual." In the case, though, that one country owes
considerably more than Is due from it, debtors then "bid against
each other for drafts, and 'eoChange' rises." It is obvious that
when the premium on this "exchange" exceeds the expense of
freight and insurance, it is cheaper to send gold in payment. Ir
gold is shipped, though, the danger arises that the currencies of
1. C. T. Revere, Review of Reviews (January, 1953), "War Debts I
and Commodity Prices, " p. 33.
2. Ibid.
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the nations involved will be upset. The country receiving the
gold experiences a rise in prices, while the one shipping the
gold sees its prices fall. There can be no restoration of normal
conditions before differences in prices lead a certain number of
importers in the country receiving the gold to buy in the country
sending the gold. Thus, through the exchange of goods, gold is ^'
drawn back to the latter country, and exchange is restored to par
again.
"The transfer problem, arising from the difference of cur-
rencies among nations and the necessity of paying debts in gold,
affects private foreign debts as much as war debts. It ever has
its counterpart in the effort to discharge domestic indebtedness*
For just as Great Britain, though she may have sufficient sums in
pounds, finds it embarrassing to buy the necessary dollars, so
the wheat farmer has plenty of bushels of grain but finds them
sadly depreciated in terms of currency. In both cases the
difficulty may be traced back to an unbalance in the exchange of
2
goods and services."
1. Edward Root, The Christian Century (November 30, 1932), "Can
we Afford to Be Paid?" p. 1467.
2. Editorial, The ^ew Republic (November 30, 1932), "World Debts
and Domestic Deflation," p. 58.
1!
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CHAPTER VI
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN EXPORT TRiU)S
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CHAPTER VI
If the United States should build up an excess of imports
over exports, she would be forced to make radical readjustments
in her economic life, an unfavorable balance of trade would
spell the loss of an important and essential foreign trade. This
loss would result in a domestic upset of no small proportions.
Upon this trade depends the prosperity of certain American in-
dustries.
The value of American exports has been given as being less
than 10 per cent of the total production of our agricultural and
industrial interests. In 1929 our exports amounted to over
15,000,000,000 in value. It has been contended that we could
get along without this trade; that the loss of this trade would
not cause anything more than a ripple on the surface of our econ-
omic activity. Some writers suggest that we could drop this 10
per cent - the 5 per cent, at least, that we carry to Europe;
that this loss could be regained by expanding our domestic
markets. The figure 10 per cent is grossly misleading. The
1
American public apparently remains incorrectly informed*
I
It should be borne in mind that the 10 per cent figure so
often quoted is only a general average of "all our production and
trade," much of which is "purely domestic in character." It
fails to reveal the importance of exports in a nmnber of out-
standing fields of production and manufacture. We can grasp
1. Harold G. Moulton, Yale Review (Autumn, 1952), "The American
|
Stake in the War Debts," p. 91. '
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readily the vi tal ssignif i cance of this trade ^hen we face the
fact that cotton, wheat, tobacco, lard, copper, petroleum prod-
ucts, automobiles, and -aachinery make up approximately three-
fifths of our entire exports; that the percentage of these prod-
•
;
ucts ex-oorted greatly exceeds, with most items, the 10 ner cent
figure,' In 1929 Americans shipped abroad 54.8 ner cent of their
cotton; 41,2 ^er cent of their production of tobacco; 33.3 per
cent of lard; 3' per cent of the copper mined; 31 per cent of
the lubricating oils; 23,3 per cent of the agricultural machinerj
20.8 per cent of the locomotives manufactured; and 14 per cent o:
the passenger automobiles turned out;''' besides, 17 per cent of
the wheat nroduced. Can anyone ''ail to realize that the loss of
this trade would affect seriously the agricultural interests
2
producing the above-mentioned raw products,'" and the industrial
plants engaged in the production of those manufactured goods, be<
sides the copper and oil producing industries?
It is pointed out that the -orice of wheat, of which less
than 18 per cent is exported, is influenced "profoundly" by
foreign demand. The mrice of tobacco and cotton is "fundamental-
ly dependent" upon foreign demand. Of course these prices are
influenced by fluctuations in the domestic demand. But, one
authority claims, the "decline in the foreign demand alone could
1. Ibid; pp. 91-92.
B, "In brief, the abolition of our export market would destroy
from one-fourth to one-half of our agricultural activity, A
large part of the present deore?sion, in fact, may be attrib-
uted to the disappearance of the export market for agricul-
tural products,"
Eernhard Ostralenk, Current History (January, 1933), "The
Dile-Tima of the War Debts, td. 419.
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readily make the difference between 16 and 6 cent cotton, and 70
1
and 50 cent wheat."
We ask, would it be possible to so increase the domestic
|
demand for these goods as to offset the loss of the foreign I
demand? The thought of such a transfer of buying is unreasonable.
Could the American people be forced to buy in much greater quan-
li
titles goods that they really do not require? True, there might
be a certain increase in demand because of the natural result of
2 I
a fall in price. But how could an increase in demand for the
|
goods diverted (supposedly) from foreign trade be sustained with
a serious curtailment of American purchasing power?
I The agricultural and industrial interests which supply the
products above-discussed are so situated as to be able to provide
for an enormous foreign demand, besides the domestic needs. VJith
production for export highly developed, and the domestic needs
amply provided for, the loss of this foreign trade would mean
nothing less than the throwing out of employment of vast numbers
of American people . In fact, whole sections of some areas would
be affected. Certain Southern states, in particular, would suf- I
fer, with the decided limitation of markets for cotton. (In
1929, we exported 54.8 per cent of our cotton.) People in the
tobacco sections of the country would be obliged to endure unem-
ployment and consequent loss of local trade. (Of our total
% production of tobacco, 41.2 per cent we shipped abroad in 1929«)
1. Ibid; D. 92
2. Ibid i
I
pit would seem that those areas devoted to the production of ag-
ricultural products would suffer most. Whole counties, even,
confine their efforts to the raising of one product. This would
Pesult in general unemployment
in those areas. Those engaged in
he manufacturing of machinery probably would not be affected so
seriously (from the standpoint of one-sided production in a larg€
section), for manufacturing plants are scattered more or less
over the country. The raining of copper, often, is combined with
li
the mining of other metals • In this line it is less likely that
a large area would be crippled by curtailment of production as in
some other lines. Geographically, the oil industry is quite well
spread out. The aggregate unemployment that would follow all
over our country from the great decrease in production, because
of our loss of foreign trade, would result in the general im-
poverishment of a large part of the American buying public. An
appreciable proportion of American purchasing power, therefore,
would be paralyzed. Domes tic markets, consequently, would ex-
perience a se rious loss of trade
.
j
The decrease in domestic trade in large areas of the country
would injure business in general, and lead, no doubt, to economic
disorganization. Numerous banks might fail. The investments of
the public would be Impaired. In the end the great American pub-
lic would be the losers. With the reduction of national income,
||
governmental income would diminish. The burden of taxation would
fall upon a smaller number of people.
^
The question naturally arises as to v/hether the labor and !'
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capital r.ow employed in the production of foreicn exports can be
transferred to other fields of production, the products to "be
'sold in the domestic markets , A country so rich in resources as
ours, one -aight think, should "be a'ble eventually to stahiii^e
its? economic life, a-^ter the los-? of a large portion of foreign
trade, to the point of experiencing independence of foreign
narkets. Theoretically such readjustment is possible, hut from
the standpoint of practical accomplishment this reorganization
prould present great difficulties. One of the chief obstacles to
the working out of such a plan - without serious delay - lies in
the fact that already we are prepared in most lines to produce
those goods we require for immedi ate domestic consumption. There
Is at T^reger t no field of production that could be enlarged
further as to allow the employment of the labor and capital from
3ther fields. We are reminded that in agriculture we have for a
lumber of years attempted to reorganize along similar lines; thai
this resulted in "little success" even during the period of ex-
pansion. Doubt is expressed as to v/hether the economic system
5f our country could live through such a readjustment,'^
"It is clear that the interests of the farmers of the
jotton, tobacco, grain, and livestock producing areas of this
jountry would be promoted by anything which tended to increase
the purchasing power of the markets of Europe, It is also clear
:hat it is to the interer^t of workmen in industries which make
^oods for the export trade, or for sale in the agricultural
,
Ibid; p. 93

sections of this country, that European markets should expand.
Similarly, it is to the interests of financial and trading groups
whose solvency is dependent upon a return of prosperity in these
great producing areas that European recovery be promoted."''" '
It is almost needless to state that it is an idle hope to
expect the American business interests to submit to a reversal of
the American commercial policy. Outside of the technical diff i- !
culties, which have been reviewed already, there exist psycho-
logical factors to be considered. Our present commercial system
is linked up profoundly with American business life in general.
Our prosperity depends on a favorable balance of trade. It
would be preposterous for anyone to expect man to agree docilely
to a plan that would involve a change from accustomed luxury to
i
that of a condition of possessing much less of the v;orld's goods.
TTho would be rash enough to credit the American public with the
altruism to adopt a policy that would spell, in a measure, its
impoverishment? We must rule out, then, the possibility of the
adoption of such a principle as the building up of an excess of
imports over exports by the American commercial interests.
1. Harold G. Moulton, Yale Review (Autumn, 1932), "The American
Stake in the War Debts," p. 95.

CHAPTER VII
ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS PACING
OUR DEBTOR COUNTRIES
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CHAPTER VII
What, now, is the economic condition of our European debtor
nations? These nations cannot "create the facilities and means"
with which payments may be made abroad. The amounts of the debt
payments have to be converted into the currencies of their
creditor governments. The "means of this conversion" has to be
provided by the money passing through the avenues of commerce
and finance between the nations of the world. The debts must be
paid from the foreign exchange which accumulates from foreign
trade .
I
But where is the export trade of these European debtors?
'If we have suffered a shrinkage in our foreign trade because of
tariff barriers, isn't it just as true that our debtor countries
lhave sustained a decided drop in exports because of tariff
walls? This means, also, that our debtors have suffered a loss
in national income. This general national impoverishment has
rendered the payment of debt instalments more burdensome. Prob-
Jlems of taxation have arisen. Difficulties have surrounded the
balancing (or the attempted balancing) of national budgets.
Monetary systems have become upset. Foreign exchange has grown
1
unstable.
All in all, the debt problem presents the principle of the
"vicious circle." Our debtor nations must have access to a
1. Debt payments involve the 'transfer' problem increasing the
"real burden to the full extent of the fall in world prices
I
of articles entering into international trade."
Sir Arthur Salter, Recovery; The Second Effort
, p. 172.

certain amount of foreign trade in order to build up a national
surplus of v/ealth for debt payments. On the other hand, the
necessity of debt payment has acted to make these same Europeans
"poorer customers for new production," thus reducing the volume
of world trade. By insisting on the full payment of the debts,
then, we are informing our debtor nations that they must "pull
themselves up by their ov/n bootstraps!"
The continuation of debt payments under the latest settle-
ment plan has served to disturb world markets. This influence
has been felt more by the wheat and cotton (world staples)
markets. On the transfer of debt payments, or the expected
transfer, even, wheat and cotton prices decline. The value of
the pound sterling in dollars declines when debt instalments are
paid, making it necessary for Great Britain - for instance - a
large user of iimerican wheat and cotton, to pay more in pounds
to purchase these products. Therefore, Great Britain must buy
less from us than she has before. That we might be able to "ex-
port as much as before in competition with Indian and Egyptian
cotton sold on a sterling basis or Australian and Canadian wheat
likewise sold on the basis of depreciated currency," our gold
1
prices must be reduced.
j!
The war debt situation has given rise to a psychological
attitude on the part of our debtor nations that we cannot afford
to ignore. There is reason to believe that our refusal to re-
1. Business Week (Dec. 7, 1952), "War Debts - V/orld Prices,"
p. 5.

consider the debts would result in a feeling of "resentment and j
I'
"bitterness" which would endanger the foreign markets still open
to us. These channels of trade might be closed by the setting up
of higher tariff walls. Or a "direct anti-American feeling"
|
might cause the buying public of our debtor countries to refuse
to buy American goods. Such action would imperil world peace.
The depression cannot be ended by a reasonable settlement of the
debt problem, but it would be a "great step toward the appease- ^'
ment which is necessary for recovery. The steady exacerbation of
international feelings resulting from a settlement of reparations
and debts which was not a settlement reveals in a clearer light I
the fundamental error of continuing the economic war after peace
had been signed. It has added continuously to post-war In-
2
security.
"
j There appears to be a growing conviction among students of
international affairs that the adjustment (preferably complete
cencellat ion) of the war debts is the key to international good-
will and confidence* We are reminded by one v/riter that "speak-
4
ing generally, a debtor nation does not love its creditor." The
peoples of these debtor nations entertain the attitude that their
progress is being seriously hampered by these debts. Many among
1. The Nation (November 25, 19o2), "War Debts Versus Recovery," |l
p. 491.
2. ii. F. Gay, Foreign Affairs
,
July, 1952, "The Great Depression,
p. 540.
The writer, in his wide reading on this subject, is led to
|
make this statement,
(ft. A. kartin. History of The United States , vol. II; p. 701.

them believe that they are paying tribute to a foreign government.
The foreign press in control of the so-called "superpatriots,
"
no doubt, spreads such dangerous propaganda, which is acceDted I
largely by the ignorant classes. With some, it is said, the
debts are regarded as a "limitation upon national independence."
^
It seems that they "carry the suggestion of national in-
feriority, and persecution. As one writer puts it: 'No democrat-
ic government can live, which assumes in the eyes of its people, i
1
the guise of a mere collecting agency for foreign creditors'."
There is little doubt that the debt problem is responsible for
the general European feeling toward the United States that we are
the "great commercial rival and financial dictator" of the
nations of Europe*
9
!• Balnbridge Colby, Proceedings of Academy of Political Science
;
vol. XV;(Niay, 19^2} "Should War Debts Be Cancelled?"; p. 72.

CHAPTER VIII
STATUS OF THE ATffiRICM TAXPAYER IN
THE EVENT OF COlvIPLETE CANCELLATION
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CHAPTER VIII
I' It is an obvious fact that further debt concessions would
|^
result in the transfer of the tax burden from the peoples of the
debtor nations to the taxpayers of our ovm land. The American
taxpayer would be obliged to make up the amoiint canceled.''" If our
government should adopt a policy of complete cancellation, just
what would be the so-called "burden" on the American taxpayer? ^
The figure has been estimated variously as between two and three
dollars per capita for each year covering the present debt set1iIe-T
ment period. The greater number of writers consulted agree on
the approximate amount of two dollars per capita. Of course this
extra "burden" would fall inequally on the American public. \
Certain sections of the United States would pay more of thia
tax than others. One author judges from press dispatches from
various parts of the country that the chief opposition to a re-
adjustment of the v/ar debts comes from the Southern and Western
agricultural districts. Yet, the thirty-two states of these
areas are the ones that would be obliged to shoulder a smaller
share of this tax than the remaining sixteen states. The thirty-
two states represent one-half the population of the United States,
or about 60,600,000 people. V/hat is their contribution to the
federal treasury in the form of direct taxes? Mr. C. T. Revere
says that for the fiscal year ended June, 1931, they paid,
1. The Business Week (November 23, 1932) intimates that war
debts and reparations are "no longer actualities," and, that
it is time we admit that the American taxpayer will have to
take upon his shoulders the "final writing off" of these
I
debts. "iiVar Debts and Business," p. 4.

approximately, 19^ per cent of the total revenue taxes levied on
incomes and corporations. This would subject them to an added
tax of only about 78 cents per capita, if the debts were com-
pletely canceled. This amount, it is pointed out, would be
approximately one-fifth of the extra tax which would be placed
on the remaining sixteen states of the Union, which are more
favorable to a reconsideration of the debt question. Since the
greater part of these direct taxes "fall upon merchants, manu-
facturers, oil producers, etc.," not much of this extra tax would
fall on the agricultural interests
I
Mr. Revere goes on to make an interesting study of how these
thirty-two states would profit by the complete cancellation of
||
the debts. He informs us that raw materials and foodstuffs, in
normal times, made up the chief items of our exports; that even
now they hold a dominant place in our overseas trade. The above-
mentioned thirty-two states "produce 65 per cent of the nation*
s
meat products, 73 per cent of exportable grains, all of our
cotton, practically all of our copper, and 95 per cent of our
2
petroleum." With a restoration of world trade these same
states would benefit most. "An advance of 2^ cents per poimd in
cotton would mean over |160,000,000 increased value for a thir-
teen million bale crop. An advance of 20 cents per bushel in
wheat would add $130,000,000 to the value of a crop of
650,000,000 bushels. n3 He offers more figures to show the gains
1. C. T. Revere, Review of Reviews ( January , 1933 ) , "V/ar Debts and
Commodity Prices," p. 34.
2. Ibid
ll
Ibid }

ithat would accrue in commodity prices to some of these states in-
jdividually. And a recovery in commodity prices v/ould be forth- a
coming, he justly points out, for "one of the chief contributory
causes of the present low commodity level is the dislocation of
exchanges arising from the necessity of making payments in
1
dollars to the United States."
While considering the American taxpayer it would be en-
lightening to ponder on the loss in income of our citizens during
the past few years - a loss ascribed, in oart, to the complexi-
ties of the war debt problem by numerous writers. One writer
states that the total income of the Americans in 1929 was about
|$85,200,000,000. The income for 1952 Bradstreet 's has just
jestimated as $37, 500,000, 00j. About a third \w should allow for
I
jthe fall in commodity prices. So, our national Income "in terms
iof goods" at the price level of 1929 is placed at about
i!i56, 200,000,000. This represents a loss of national income of at
jleast ;4i29, 000,000,000 a year. The loss of $280,000,000 annually
Ifrom the cancellation of the war debts would represent less than
,2
one one-hundredth of this loss in national income.
I
A notev/orthy comparison is m-ade by the same v/riter in apply-
ing these figures to the individual. The per capita national in-
come of 1929, which was #704, dwindled to $300 in 1932, or "in
terms of goods" to about |450. The federal expenditures for 1931
are estimated as §3, 300, 000, 000, or 26.40 per capita. vVith the
1. Ibid.
2. The Nation (December 14, 1932), "War Debts and Taxpayers,"
p.. 582.
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full payment of the annual instalments of war debts this quota
would be reduced by ^2.24. The writer then raises a few queries.
"Is it better for that taxpayer to have an income of $704, and
pay $26.40 of it in taxes, or is it better for him to pay only
1424.16 of his income in taxes, but to have an income of only
'1450? Should he lose ^2d0 of his annual income in order to save
$2 in taxes? Should he lose 35 per cent of his income in order
'to save 1/3 of 1 per cent?""^ It may be objected that this com-
parison is unfair, for it is made on the assumption that can-
cellation of the v/ar debts would result immediately in a return
:to prosperity. If we did "assume that cancellation or reduction
Would take us only one-tenth of the way back - and in our opin-
ion, it would surely do much better than that - the gain to the
American taxpayer as a result of cancellation or drastic re-
2
duction would still be at the rate of more than ten to one."
In an earlier issue the same publication reveals that our
exports to Europe since 1929 have declined to a figure which
represents four times the debt instalment due in 1952 - or a
decline of more than :^1, 000, 000, 000. At the same time it is
contended that a restoration of our foreign trade would enable
our government to collect more than $300,000,000 annually in
1. Ibid
2. Ibid
ii

customs duties. Economists assert that simply an increase of
1 per cent in our yearly national income over the low levels
that exist today would exceed twice the current annual instalment
on the debts. As in a later issue of this publication, referred
to in this discussion, it is claimed that we are losing almost
130,000,000,000 a year in national income. Or, we experience,
'because of the depression, a loss of $100 annually for every
dollar owed us in annual instalments of the debt payments.
Senator William E. Borah is an advocate of debt cancellation
'if these debts can be exchanged for prosperity. He takes the
;
I:
position that these "debts are simple economic facts; they are '
liot a fetish, they are not a thing to be worshipped. They are
economic facts which we may exchange for other economic facts if
those economic facts are more valuable to the American people II
It is estimated by such men as Professor Fisher that
''this depression has cost the American people alone
$150,000,000,000. Now, we get $250,000,000 a year - if we get
it - from these foreign nations. I would be delighted to trade
$250,000,000 to stop the devastating effect of the
$150,000,000,000 depression."'
;
A recognized authority on the war debts feels that although
the wiping out of the debt obligations would not cure the many
|j
1. Mr. Edward T. Root says that the Foreign Policy Association
reports a decline in customs duties, during the past two
years, of |498,000,000. This is ,124,000,000 more than the war
debt payments which should have been made during the same
period. The Christian Century (November 30,19^2), "Can We
Afford to idQ Paid?"; p. 1469.
,.
2. The In ation (November 23, 1933 j , "War Debts versus Hecovery,"p.491.
=2^ Senator William JU-BorAh,Th© Literary Digest Polital
—
Cyclopedia
, p. 203.
^
I
I'
Ills with which the world is afflicted, "economic analysis" leads
unquestionably to the conclusion that world prosperity would be
made "much easier" in the absence of the "disquieting effects" of
the war debt payments. Such is the lesson taught by fourteen
1 i!
years* experience with the debt problem.
Apparently there exists among the American public today the
piistaken belief that the full payment of the war debts would
greatly aid the balancing of the national budget. The funds from
pur debtor governments under the debt settlements have not been
ddded to the federal budget. It is the "stated policy" of the
! 2
tCreasury Department to apply the funds received under the debt
IBgreenents to the "retiring" of the public debt. Until recentljij
at least, "payment against the principal" of the war debts has
been used to reduce the public or federal debt. These payments
have not afforded much relief in the "direct reduction of tax-
ation." Interest payments, though, may be used to defray current
expenses. The debtor governments may make their interest pay-
jj
inents, with certain exceptions, in obligations of our government,
4
with the result that the public debt is thereby reduced."
[
1. Harold G. i/ioulton, Yale Rev iev/ (Autumn, 1932 ), "The American
Stake in the War Debts," p. 96.
2. Foreign Policy Association ; vol. Ill, special supplement no.l;
"The United States and the War Debts"; p. 24.
3. However, the use of war debt payments to reduce the public
debt would "consequently bring about a reduction in annual in
terest charges." In this way the debt payments would serve to
"reduce by 10 per cent the amount that American citizens would
be required to pay for the general expenses of the govern-
ment." This would relieve the taxpayers of a per capita im-
post of between two to four dollars annually. Ibid.
4. Jan.es W. Angell, Foreign Policy Keports ; vol. VII, no. 4;
j^Agj^ll 29^ 1951) ; ^Reparations and the Inter-Ally Debts in

A number of writers could be quoted to show further that
the trend of opinion among the students of public affairs points
to the realization that the war debt problem is a major factor
in the world-wide depression. True it is that some of these ob-
iservers do not advocate complete cancellation; but they do ask
'for a substantial revision downv/ard of these debts. Those who
jdo call for a readjustment of the war debt question reach the
jcommon conclusion that such action would mean the restoration,
iin some measure, of world trade and the consequent general
[amelioration of economic conditions the world over. They con-
||tend - and logically - that, although complete cancellation
jlflfould transfer the tax burden to the American public, that tax
I'
jiwould be comparatively light. They further claim that such a
I
jmoderate impost, by far , would be offset by an increase in
national income that would result from the stimulation of world
business*
I
!
I

The American government loaned to twenty countries the
approximate total of ^11,000,000,000 from April 1, 1917, to
November 30, 1920. These loans are divided into two periods,
the pre-armistice and the post-armistice loans. The United
States received from these coiintries commercial notes bearing,
in most cases, interest at the rate of 5 per cent. Our govern-
ment advanced these loans at a time when the financial resources
of the Allies v/ere exhausted; when their stores of supplies were
low; at a time their best man power had diminished greatly, and
when their morale appeared to be shaken severely. The credits
advanced to the Allies were used chiefly in the purchasing of
supplies in the United States, iiarly in the decade of 1920-1930
debt-funding agreements were reached by the United States and
the greater number of her debtor nations, v/hereby debt payments
were to be extended over a period of 62 years, with a rate of
interest of 3 per cent for the first 10 years, and for the re-
maining 52 years a rate of interest of 3^ per cent.
I
There is a wide variation of attitude toward the war debt
question by individuals in the United States, a certain group
contends that the debts are legitimate commercial loans; that
cancellation v/ould impose a burden on the American taxpayer.
Another group favors modification of the debt settlement, depend
ing on capacity to pay, and a consideration of the general price
levels at the time the debts were incurred and the price levels
from now on. Still others call for an indefinite moratorium on
r.Loublv J
lidebts, until the restoration of world trade.
!;
It is self-evident that a nation owing a great foreign debt
must be able to sell her services or goods to her creditor
nations, or nations which receive the "exchange" of these
creditor nations, in order that she might accumulate the "ex-
I
change" of her creditor nations with which to make payment. The
''United States, though, has built up a merchant marine that is
jicarrying now the larger part of her goods in foreign trade -
\
[depriving, in a large measure, the selling of services in that
ifield by the debtor nations. Restrictions on immigration have
'been such since the end of the war that the selling of services
|by the debtor nations in the transportation of inmiigrants - who
would be sending remittances back to countries which are debtors
to the United States - has limited greatly that source of
American dollars. The expenditures of American tourists abroad,
another source of income to the debtor nations, has been so in-
i'
creasingly curtailed that that must be judged as a negligible
factor. It is obvious, then, that payment must be made by the
Iiishipment of goods.
The conditions under which goods might be shipped, though,
prove difficult, because of the setting up of tariff barriers by
Ijmany nations. Not only do the debtor nations suffer by such
policies, but also the creditor nations lose. The latter, who,
in many cases, deliberately are shutting out the goods of their
debtor countries, are making payments due them more of a burden
1^0 their debtors. The only alternative. If these debtor govern-
i
J2
nent? are not going to default, is for these Fame nations to
curtail their imports, thus Btrivin,^ to "build up an excenf. of
export? over imports, Sorae de"btor nations have resorted to this
policy.
The United States should realize that the dehtor nations
Inust have a favorable "balance of trade in order that they may
save American dollars for deht payments, tesiden for purchases
of necenpary imports. But such a state of affair.? would involve
a revolutionary change in American coi^i-nercial policy and in her
general economi c^lif e ; she would "be o"bliged to import more than
ehe exports. This step would "be too unselfish, too altruistic,
for the American "business interests to undertake. No one could
expect a great, wealthy poorer, dependent on foreign trade for
its i;^mediate prosperity, to lower deliberately its national in-
come, for the sake of helpin.r; the rest of the Vv'orld,
An unfavorable "balance of trade on the part of the United
States would mean the curtailment of an iminortant and necessary
expert trade. A high percentage - "between 20 ^ner cent and ^0 per
cent - of the total production of certrin Ar.ierican gcods are
shipped a'broad. Some of our largest agricultural and industrial
interests would "be crir;pled. In particular, the cotton, to"bacco,
tnc
wheat areas would suffer; &.s would automo'bile and machinery
anufacturing plants, copper mines, and oil producing and live-
stock gron^irg area?. General unemployment ^vould follow in the
wake of curtailment of exports on th.e part of the ahove-menti one(
[
interests. This unempl oym.ent v;ould spell the loss of the pur-
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chasing power of a Isrge part of the American "buying public. The
significance of this is a consequent serious loss of domestic
trade, rith attendant general economic di s turhances the country''
over. It would he difficult to transfer the capital and lahor
fro::i these "crippled" agricultural and industrial interests to
other field? of endeavor, Most lines of production are so high
ly developed now that they are able to produce the immediate de
mands of our foreign and domestic markets' There could he no
sustained sale of surplus goods at first, when there is no con-
stent demand, in our domestic markets.
It is undeniable that the present debt settlement is a
burden on the ^?orld at large, particularly, of course, the debt
or nations. With tariff barriers shutting out, to a marked ex-
tent, the goods from the sale of v;hich debtor countries hoped to
accumulate A-nerican dollars, debt payments have been made more
difficult. These nations will lower their standards of living
no doubt, by their resorting to a curtailment of imports. Gen
eral national impoverishment has set in. The debtor nations
must have access to a certain share of foreign trade in order to
build up a national surplus for debt nayment; on the other hand,
by the necessity of making these payments, these same nations
are so generally impoverished that they afford limited markets
for new production, thus reducing the volume of world trade]
Besides these economic factors, there exist psychological
factors with which the American people must reckon. A portion
of the citizens of the debtor nations apparently are led to be-
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Lieve that they are paying trilDute to a foreign power; that theiij
indeperjder.ee is being limited because of the war debts. The
debt problem seems to be largely responsible for the general
European feeling that Uncle Sam is the "great commercial rival
(and financial dictator" of the nations of Europe,
The complete cancellation of the war debts v/ould transfer
an extra tax to the shoulders of the American taxpayer. Such an
added impost is estimated at two dollars per ca.pita annually.
But it is contended, vfith reason, that complete cancellation
irould so serve to stimulate better business conditions the vrorld
over, that this comparatively light tax would be offset, in no
small measure, by the increered national income of the American
|)ublic. It is a limited number of individuals, f'-.ough, that
realize that full payment of the debts would not contribute
appreciably to the national or federal budget since the Treasury
department has adopted a Dolic:/ that payments on the principal
Df the debt? must be applied to reduce the public debt of the
Jnited States rather than to reduce taxes.

SECOKDAfiY SOUHGES
1, Franklin Escher, Foreign Exchange Explained ; The MacMillan
Company, 1920.
No direct reference was made to this volume. It was
|
studied for a review of the general principles of exchange as
applied to foreign trade*
j
2. Harvey E. Pisk, The Inter-Ally Debts ; Bankers Trust Company,
1924.
This source, a carefully compiled volume, is replete with
material for the development of the historical background of
the inter-governraental debts. It was referred to a number of
times.
5. A. E. kartin. History of the United States , vol. II; Ginn and
Company, 1931. Il
! In this text about four pages devoted to a discussion of
the v/ar debts were studied. One reference was made to this
volume.
4. Harold G. i/loulton and Leo Pasvolsky, War Debts and Vvorld
Prosperity ; George Banta Publishing Company, 1932.
Considered an outstanding authoritative work on the war
debts, this volume furnished a number of references on the
history of the debts, and some guiding ideas on the trade
aspects of the same subject.
5. National Industrial Conference Board, The Inter-Ally Debts
and the United states ; published by the National Industrial
Conference Board, Inc., 1925.
\I
This is a valuable work compiled by a group of men who
are experts in their respective fields. In this book practi-
cally every phase of the war debt question is covered - in
particular, the war debts as they affect American Industry.
Sir Arthur Salter, K, C. B. , Recovery: The Second Effort ;
The Century Company, ,1952.
j
Recognized as an important 'work on the v/orld depression
in general, this vol^jme limits the discussion of the war
|
debts to a comparatively small space. Some thoughts were
j
gathered from this source on the viewpoint of a liberal mod-
ificationist. A few references were made to the material on
the tariff situation.
Eugene Thwing, editor. The Literary Digest Political Cyclo-
pedia ; Punk and Wagnalls Company, 1932.
This handy volume contains the views on various topics
held by the national parties which participated in the nationj-
al compaign of 1952. Two references were made to this work
on the tariff question and trade aspects of the debt problem.
Woodrow Wilson, The War Message and Facts Behind It ; Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1917.
|j
The Committee on Public Information prepared this anno-
tated text of President Wilson's War Message of April 2,1917.
In the use of this volume, reference was made to the words of
the war-time President in respect to the aid he felt we shoiid
give the Allies in the prosecution of the war.
j
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PAMPHLETS
9. Lev/is V/ebster Jones, Foreign Policy Association (Information
Service); Vol. Ill; Special Supplement no. 1; "The United
States and the War Debts"; published by the Research Depart-
ment of the Foreign Policy Association, (about) 1927.
|
This proved to be one of the most valuable sources of
material on the whole war debt problem. It is a compact re-
view of the history of the war debts and their general bear-
ing on the economic wellbeing of the world - the United States^
in particular.
This pamphlet served to furnish the guiding ideas in the
development of the history of the debts. NiJinerous references
were made to this excellent "Memorandum."
PERIODICALS
10. Proceedings of Academy of Political Science , vol. XV, no.l;
(kay, 1932); published by the Academy of Political Science;
Columbia University.
A compilation of addresses of various national figures,
this work furnished the opinions of four men, under the
topic (in the thesis) of representative viewpoints on the
i|
settlement of the war debt question.
^ Most of the periodicals listed below, with the exception of
the Literary Digest
,
were used liberally. Reference was made at
'least once to most of these periodicals, which provided the
I[larger amount of material in the discussion of the trade aspects
;of the war debts.

_ n.^..^ _ —
11, Contemporary Review , June, 1932.
12# Christian Century , December 14, 1952.
13. Graphic Survey , November 1, 1932.
14. The Literary Digest , November 26, 1932.
15. The Saturday Evening Post , December 24, 1932.
16. Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. VII, no. 4, April 29, 1931.
17. The Commonweal , November 23, 1932.
18. Yale Review
,
Aut^omn number, 1932.
19. The Literary Digest , December 3, 1932.
20. Christian Century
,
November 30, 1932.
21. Foreign Policy Reports
, Vol. VII, no. 22, January 6, 1932.
22. Review of Reviews
,
January, 1933.
23. The Saturday Evening Post , December 10, 1932.
24. The Literary Digest , December 10, 1932.
25. The Commonweal
,
July 27, 1932.
26. The v;orld Tomorrov/ , December 7, 1932.
27. The Saturday Evening Post
,
August 13, 1932.
28. The Business vVeek, November 23, 1932.
29. The Literary Digest , December 17, 1932.
30. The New Outlook
,
December, 1932.
31. The Commonweal , October 19, 1932.
32. The Saturday Evening Post
,
January 7, 1933.
33. The Christian Century
,
August 31, 1932.
34. The New Republic , November 30, 1932.
35. The Nation , December 14, 1932.
36. Foreign Affairs
,
July, 1932.
II
I
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37. The ConuTiOn-tfeal
.
November 50, 1933.
38. The Saturday Eveainp: Post
.
Novemoer 5, 1932,
39. The North Ameiican Revieftf
.
November, 1932.
I
40. The Buainesa Week » December 7, 1932.
|i
41. The Nation . November 33, 1S32.
II
42. Current History
.
January, 1933.
I
43. National Republic
.
June, 1932.
l| 44. The Literary Dip-est
.
December 24, 1932.
i!
I
45. The Nation
.
December 7, 1932.
46. The Liuerary Digest
.
December 31, 1S3S.
47. Collier'
3
.
February 25, 1933.
48. The Boston Herald
.
April 13, 1933.
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